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power is a dominant one which can be asserted to the exclusion of any competing or
conflicting one. The power is. .. "a dominant servitude"... 'a superior navigation
21
easement.1
Under this view of the case any time the government had the power to regulate
use of property, that power would automatically create a property right in the
government. Take, for example, land especially valuable as a site for a liquor
store, which, of course, requires a state license. If the state decided to establish
a system of state liquor stores it could take the land at a reduced price under the
theory that, as to this use, its licensing power had given it a prior property
right. This would apparently be the case even though the bill which provided
for the licensing power was not intended to give the state any "property rights"
but was intended only to allow regulation of certain types of commerce. Furthermore, since Douglas did not argue from the Federal Power Act, but directly
from the Commerce Clause itself, presumably no enacting statute would be
required. This rather surprising extension of regulatory powers is far beyond
the originally intended scope of these powers. It is difficult to see what it accomplishes other than allowing the government to take certain lands at bargain
prices.
As the Fifth Amendment proscribes the government from taking land at
bargain prices so does the power of eminent domain, which inures in every sovereign, allow it to obtain needed land without paying a hold-up value. In an
economy based on private enterprise the use of such extra-economic power
should be exercised so that it has as little effect as possible on the workings of
legitimate economic factors. This can only be done by application of the traditional market value standard. Continued application of the Twin City rule will
not only discourage expenditures for private power development, but it will
also place the cost of land acquisition for any power development on the present
owners of suitable land rather than on consumers or taxpayers where the
burden properly belongs.
21United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 224-25 (1956).

STRANGER ATTACK ON SISTER-STATE
DECREES OF DIVORCE
Perplexing doctrinal difficulties are presented by the problem of stranger
attack2 on sister-state decrees of divorce. Given a finding by the divorce court
IA "stranger" in this context is a third party who, though neither party nor privy, has
some right or interest which is affected by the purported dissolution of a marital status; for
example, a subsequent spouse, a legatee of a subsequent spouse, a tenant of a party, or a
sister state in which a party is domiciled. Consult note 2 infra.
2Attack may be waged in various ways, and may be initiated by the moving party or
introduced as a defense. E.g., Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951) (action for annulment by
subsequent spouse); In re Estate of Day, 7 111. 2d 348, 131 N.E. 2d 50 (1955) (probate of will
by legatee of subsequent spouse); Williams v; North Carolina H,325 U.S. 226 (1945) (criminal
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that plaintiff was domiciled within the jurisdiction, two phenomena may result.
First, if the finding of domicile is unimpeachable in the forum in which attack
is waged, either because it cannot be demonstrated to be erroneous 4 or cannot
be reopened, 5 then strangers are bound by the divorce decree. And yet, the
notion that divorce is a proceeding in rem, i.e., "binding on the whole world,"'
has been discredited of late. 7 Second, if the forum of attack finds that the issue
of domicile was incorrectly decided, stranger attack will succeed if the divorce
proceedings were ex parte,8 apparently on the theory that domicile is a constitutional prerequisite for full faith and credit. 9 But if the divorce proceedings were
bilateral, ° then strangers are precluded from showing what might otherwise be
a fatal absence of domicile.' The ex parte-bilateral distinction makes sense with
respect to party attack because of the opportunity to litigate in the original
proceedings, 2 but it is less easy to rationalize when applied to strangers. The
ex parte situation may be explained by the view that divorce is a proceeding in
rem, for even a judgment in rem may be collaterally attacked for jurisdictional
action for bigamous cohabitation); Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. (U.S.) 108 (1869) (action by
defendant spouse against tenant of plaintiff spouse to recover rents).
3 As used hereinafter, "domicile" refers to the divorce court's finding on the issue of plaintiff's domicile, not to the absolute fact of domicile. Although it seems that a finding that defendant is domiciled within the divorce state would be sufficient, no case has been located
which involves this precise question.
4See Williams v. North Carolina II, 325 U.S. 226, 227 (1945).
5 Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126, 128 (1951). Cf. Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581, 589
(1951).
62 Freeman, Judgments §906 (5th ed., 1925).
, Williams v. North Carolina I,325 U.S. 226, 232 (1945); Williams v. North Carolina I,
317 U.S., 287, 297 (1942); Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 576 (1906). The traditional
view is stated in the dissent in Haddock v. Haddock, supra, at 624, and in 2 Bishop, Marriage and Divorce §164 (4th ed., 1896).
8Williams v. North Carolina I, 325 U.S. 226 (1945). The court in Hopson v. Hopson,
221 F.2d 839, 842 n.4 (App. D.C., 1955), defines an "ex parte" proceeding as "one in which
there had been neither personal service of process nor voluntary appearance or participation
by the spouse sued." Justice Jackson, dissenting in Rice v. Rice, 336 U.S. 674, 678 (1949),
declared, "To me ex partedivorce is a concept as perverse and unrealistic as an ex parle marriage."
9Williams v. North Carolina II, 325 U.S. 226, at 227, 229 (1945). When the decree of
divorce is that of a foreign country, where the doctrine of comity and not that of full faith
and credit applies, the absence of a finding of domicile will not preclude its validity in the
attack forum. Drew v. Hobby, 123 F.Supp. 245, 248 (S.D.N.Y., 1954): "It is not offensive to
the public policy of New York to recognize, despite the absence of the 'jurisidctional fact' of
domicile, a foreign divorce obtained by parties to a marriage who have taken the marital res
out of the state for the purpose of invoking a divorcing jurisdiction, by the actual appearance
of one... coupled with the voluntary appearance of the other through authorized counsel."
10A bilateral divorce is a proceeding wherein the divorce court has personal jurisdiction
over the defendant spouse.
" Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951).
1 Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
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defect.13 But since appearance by the defendant in the divorce proceedings
wholly precludes a stranger from demonstrating lack of domicile, the result is
to clothe the bilateral decree with an impregnability greater than the typical
judgment in rem.
The purpose of this comment is to examine the law of stranger attack on
sister-state decrees of divorce, in order to develop a legal framework upon which
to base the results of present-day case law, 14 and by which the answers to
unsettled questions may be predicted with a fair degree of certainty.15 Although
it has been accurately stated that analysis of the problem is not promoted by
labelling a suit for divorce an action in rem, 16 some precision in describing the
limits of the needed framework may be reached by measuring the effect of ex
parte and bilateral decrees against the effect of judgments in rem, as well as in
personam.
Ex parlt divorce. The binding effect of an ex parte decree in another state is
dependent upon whether or not a litigant can persuade the forum of attack that
the finding of domicile by the divorce court was incorrect. 17 Notwithstanding
the receipt of proof against this finding, if the heavy burden", of overturning it
is not sustained, then full faith and credit is mandatory and stranger attack in
the other state cannot succeed. 19 A minority of jurisdictions even withhold the
13 Rest., Judgments §73, Comment a (1942): "The judgment [in rem] is not subject to collateral attack by anyone, unless the judgment was void because the court did not have jurisdiction over the thing or was not competent to render the judgment or there was a failure to
give proper notice and opportunity to be heard." Compare ibid., §74, Comment a. Consult
authorities cited note 21 infra.
14 The absence of a satisfactory legal framework is manifest in Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S.
126 (1951); language there epitomizes the difficulty of analysis in this area of the law. Consult
text at note 48 infra.
16The major unsolved problem, whether a state can impeach a sister-state bilateral decree
of divorce, is discussed at 387 infra.
16 See, e.g., Williams v. North Carolina I, 317 U.S. 287, 297 (1942).
17 Williams v. North Carolina II, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
's Williams v. North Carolina II, 325 U.S. 226, 233-34 (1945) ("The burden of undermining the verity which the Nevada decrees import rests heavily upon the assailant.").
But justice Black, dissenting at 275, felt that the burden should be much heavier. For illustrations of the burden, see Rice v. Rice, 336 U.S. 674 (1949); Commonwealth v. Petrosky,
168 Pa.Super. 232, 77 A.2d 647 (1951); Patterson v. Patterson, 208 Ga. 7, 64 S.E.2d 441
(1951); Ludwig v. Ludwig, 413 Ill. 44, 107 N.E.2d 848 (1952).
19The fullness of the faith and credit due an ex parte decree founded on an unimpeachable
determination of plaintiff's domicile is pointed up by the holding in Williams v. North Carolina
I, 317 U.S. 287 (1942). So long as the defendant spouse remains its domiciliary the attacking
state has an interest in the marital status at least equivalent to that of the divorce state, but
the full faith and credit clause commands that the attacking state smother its protests.
"The very function of the [full faith and credit] clause is to compel the states to give effect
to the contrary policies of other states when these have been validly embodied in judgment. ...
The foreclosure was not intended only for slight differences or for unimportant matters. It
was also meant for the most important ones. The Constitution was not dealing with puny
matters. . . ." Williams v. North Carolina II, 325 U.S. 226, 254 (1945) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). Cf. Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
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opportunity to re-litigate the issue of domicile unless the stranger's interest in
the marital res or status matured prior to the decree sought to be overthrown."
The justification for this conclusive effect with respect to strangers may be
found in the theory of actions in rem generally-the notion that some disputes
need to be settled finally notwithstanding the lack of personal jurisdiction over
all claimants to the res.2 1 Thus, it was early held that legislative 2 2 and judicial 23
termination of marriage without personal jurisdiction over the defendant spouse
does not unjustly deprive him of his interest in the marital status. And since it
is difficult to imagine a case in which a defendant spouse would possess less
interest in the marital status than a stranger, it seems, a fortiori, that there is
no injustice to the stranger.
When the assailant sustains the requisite burden, Williams v. North Carolina
1124 holds that the courts of a sister state may reject25 the divorce forum's finding
of domicile without violating the constitutional mandate of full faith and
credit.25 Whereas the attack in Williams II was launched by a sister state, it
seems clear in reference to ex parte divorces that there are no significant distinctions among the various possible assailants of the decree which may operate
21See Gaylord v. Gaylord, 45 So.2d 507 (Fia., 1950). Cases are instructively collected in
Old Colony Trust Co. v. Porter, 324 Mass. 581, 589, 88 N.E.2d 135, 140 (1949) (Qua,C.J.).
Consult 1 Freeman, judgments §§319, 636 (5th ed., 1925); The Dilemma of Third Party Attack
Upon Foreign Divorces, 17 Brooklyn L. Rev. 70, 72-73 (1950).
21Consult Rest., Judgments §2, Comments a and b (1942).
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155 (1901). But cf. Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562
(1906) (collecting the early cases), which was expressly overruled by Williams v. North Carolina I, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
2

2

3 Atherton

24 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
25The attack forum's rejection is reviewable by the Supreme Court as a federal question
involving full faith and credit. Williams v. North Carolina 11, 325 U.S. 226, 233 (1945).
26 Justice Rutledge, dissenting in Williams v. North Carolina 11, 325 U.S. 226, 267 (1945),
feared that this result would give rise to the anomaly thought to exist subsequent to Haddock
v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906), i.e., parties divorced in the divorce state and still married
in the attack state. But a subsequent case requiring full faith and credit to the attacking
judgment has proved the anxiety ill-founded. Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402, 408 (1952): The
New York (impeaching) "decree is entitled to full faith throughout the Nation, in Nevada
[divorce state] as well as in Illinois."
The necessity of a finding of domicile is also raised by a line of cases involving bilateral decrees which do not purport to rest on a finding of domicile. Consult discussion 385-86 infra.
These cases indicate that such a decree is not entitled to full faith and credit and therefore does
not bind strangers-at least where the divorce state has no interest other than mere physical
presence of the parties. A fortiori this would be true of the ex parte situation. However, even if
domicile is discarded (either wholly or in special circumstances) as a basis for jurisdiction in
bilateral cases, it is unlikely that an extension of this innovation to ex parte cases would be
permitted. In effect, such an extension would be contra to Williams v. North Carolina II, 325
U.S. 226 (1945), for it is difficult to comprehend how a decree not purporting to be based on
domicile can have a greater effect than a decree which does so purport, although erroneously.
Further, the suggested extension would result in what may be deemed an undesirable state
of affairs: any spouse could obtain a divorce in any state which would be entitled to full faith
and credit in every other state.
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to permit attack by one and preclude it by another.2 7 Thus, where a defendant
spouse can succeed in collateral attack, 2s so also can a subsequent spouse 29 or
another state;30 and where a defendant spouse cannot succeed,31 neither can a
subsequent spouse32 or another state. 3
Throughout, the Achilles' heel is the same jurisdictional defect-an impeachable finding of domicile-and where the finding of domicile is unimpeachable
so that the defendant spouse is bound by the foreign ex parte decree of divorce,
strangers-including a state-are likewise bound. Consequently, notwithstanding the absence from the divorce proceeding of anything comparable to the
minimum requirement of constructive notice to strangers applicable to in rem
proceedings, the ex parte decree of divorce is similar to the latter in its conclu34
sive effect.
27
Note, however, the minority rule that to have standing to attack a. stranger's interest
must have accrued prior to the purported dissolution of the marital status. Consult authorities
note 20 supra.
28Rice v. Rice, 336 U.S. 674 (1949); Ryan v. Ryan, 230 F.2d 838 (App. D.C., 1956);
Ludwig v. Ludwig, 413 Ill. 44, 107 N.E.2d 848 (1952); Ulrey v. Ulrey, 231 Ind. 63, 106 N.E.2d
793 (1952). The same is true, of course, with respect to privies. E.g., In re Veltri's Estate,
202 N.Y. Misc. 401, 113 N.Y.S.2d 146 (Surr. Ct., 1952) (attack by step-children).
2
9Jackson v. Jackson, 274 App.Div. 43, 79 N.Y.S.2d 736 (1st Dep't, 1948). Where the
finding of domicile is vulnerable, however, an attack by the subsequent spouse may be turned
back if defendant can show that the subsequent spouse either helped to procure the divorce or
knowingly relied upon it when he married one of the parties to the divorce. Estate of Coleman,
132 Cal.App.2d 137, 281 P.2d 567 (1955) (heirs of subsequent spouse prevented from attacking the divorce decree as privies to the subsequent spouse who would himself have been
estopped). An interesting approach to the establishment of such an estoppel against the subsequent spouse is suggested in Watkinson v. Watkinson, 67 NJ.Eq. 142, 157, 58 Atl. 384, 390
(Ch., 1904), where the duty of a subsequent spouse to investigate the competency of his intended mate to join with him in the execution of a marriage contract was likened unto the duty
of a land-title examiner. And see Woodhouse v. Woodhouse, 11 N.J. 225, 94 A.2d 301 (1953).
30Williams v. North Carolina II, 325 U.S. 226 (1945); Long v. State, 5 Ter.(Del.) 262, 65
A.2d 489 (1949); State v. Nixon, 4 Ter.(Del.) 318,46 A.2d 874 (1946); State v. Najjar, 1 N.J.
Super. 208, 63 A.2d 807 (1949), aff'd 2. N.J. 208, 66 A.2d 37 (1949) (Mexican "mail-order"
divorce). No case has been found illustrating an attack by a non-domiciliary state. The reason
for this may perhaps be found in Williams v. North Carolina I, 317 U.S. 287, 298-99 (1942),
and in Williams v. North Carolina 11, 325 U.S. 226,241-42 (1945), to the effect that an attacking state's interest in the marital res has its genesis in domicile.
3t E.g., Zieper v. Zieper, 14 N.J. 551, 103 A.2d 366 (1954). The only relief available to the
divorced spouse is found in the growing doctrine of divisibility, which is designed to protect
personal rights, in contradistinction to rights in rem, in the marital status. Armstrong v.
Armstrong, 350 U.S. 568 (1956); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953); Estin v. Estin, 334
U.S. 541 (1948) (leading case); Kreiger v. Kreiger, 334 U.S. 555 (1948); Ryan v. Ryan, 230
F.2d 838 (App. D.C., 1956); Meredith v. Meredith, 226 F.2d 257 (App. D.C., 1955); Hopson
v. Hopson, 221 F.2d 839 (App. D.C., 1955). But some courts are inclined to the view that the
absent defendant spouse must have commenced his action in personam prior to the rendition
of the decree of divorce. Anglin v. Anglin, 211 Miss. 405, 51 So.2d 781 (1951); Proper v.
Proper, 102 Cal.App.2d 612, 228 P.2d 62 (1951); Shain v. Shain. 324 Mass. 603, 88 N.E.2d
143 (1949). Consult Morris, Divisible Divorce, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1287 (4951).
s2 See Jackson v. Jackson, 274 App.Div. 43, 44-45, 79 N.Y.S.2d 736, 738 (1st Dept., 1948).

33Williams v. North Carolina I, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
'4 Consult authorities note 13 supra.
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Bilateral divorce. Analysis of stranger attack on sister-state bilateral decrees
of divorce produces a rather startling conclusion. It was early established that
domicile of the plaintiff spouse and personal appearance by the defendant
spouse were sufficient to entitle the decree to full faith and credit elsewhere,
even as to strangers. 5 Today, however, a finding of domicile coupled with personal appearance by the defendant spouse will operate to preclude collateral
attack whether by a party," privy 7 or stranger," and irrespective of whether
or not the finding of domicile might otherwise be subject to impeachment.", The
would-be assailant of a bilateral decree based on a finding of domicile is bound
thereby and given no opportunity to attack for lack of domicile. In sharp contrast is the ex parte situation, where the assailant is given an opportunity in the
35 In Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall.(U.S.) 108 (1869), W moved from the District of Columbia
to Indiana and instituted a suit for divorce in which H appeared and denied all her allegations.
Indiana granted W a divorce and ordered that some rents from certain of W's property be
paid to H. In an action on the decree in the District of Columbia, T, defendant tenant of that
portion of W's property, refused to pay H, but not expressly on the ground of the invalidity of
the divorce decree. Held for H.
36 Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948) (appeared and admitted domicile); Sherrer v. Sherrer,
334 U.S. 343 (1948) (appeared and entered a general denial); Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32
(1938) (appeared and contested domicile). Cf. Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n,
283 U.S. 522 (1931). A special appearance to contest jurisdiction is sufficient to confer personal
jurisdiction upon the court. E.g., Cherry v. Cherry, 208 Ga. 213, 65 S.E.2d 805 (1951), aff'd 208
Ga. 726, 69 S.E.2d 252 (1952). Contra: Davis v. Davis, 259 Wis. 1, 47 N.W.2d 338 (1951),
where the court used the distinction in Staedler v. Staedler, 6 N.J. 380, 78 A.2d 896 (1951), i.e.,
physical presence, whereas the accepted distinction, Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581,
587 (1951), is opportunity to contest. Consult Swanson, Migratory Divorce: Sherrer v. Sherrer
and the Future, 18 Nev. S. B. J. 81 (1953).
37 Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951) (attack by children of party). But consult
1 Freeman, Judgments §481 (5th ed., 1925), for the view that children are not customarily
considered to be in privity with their parents. Consult Standing of Children To Attack Their
Parents Divorce Decree, 50 Col. L. Rev. 833 (1950), for the argument against permitting such
attack. The Supreme Court held in the Johnson case that the law of the divorce forum should
describe the limits of privity, within the boundaries of due process of law. Consult Toward
Certainty in the Extraterritorial Effect of Divorce Decrees, 61 Yale L. J. 238 (1952).
3"Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951) (subsequent spouse); Taylor v. Taylor, 229 S.C. 92,
91 S.E.2d 876 (1956) (subsequent spouse); In re Estate of Day, 7 Ill.2d 348, 131 N.E.2d
50 (1955) (legatee of subsequent spouse); Tierney v. Tierney, 332 Mass. 414, 125 N.E.2d 413
(1955) (subsequent spouse); Dietrich v. Dietrich, 41 Cal.2d 497, 261 P.2d 269 (1953) (subsequent spouse); DuPont v. DuPont, 8 Ter.(Del.) 231, 90 A.2d 468 (1952) (subsequent spouse);
Widera v. Widera, 200 N.Y.Misc. 753, 113 N.Y.S.2d 127 (S. Ct., 1952) (subsequent spouse);
Kienle v. Kienle, 201 N.Y.Misc. 948, 107 N.Y.S.2d 239 (S. Ct., 1951) (subsequent spouse).
Consult Lenhoff, Attacks on Vulnerable Foreign Divorces: Outposts of Resistance, 21
N.Y.U. L. Q. Rev. 457 (1947); Jacobs, Attack on Decrees of Divorce by Second Spouses, 15
N.C. L. Rev. 136 (1937); The Dilemma of Third Party Attacks upon Foreign Divorces,
op. cit. supra. note 20.
39The important qualification stated in Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581, 587 (1951),
and in Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S., 126, 128 (1951), to the effect that collateral attack may succeed if the divorce state would allow such attack, seems to have little force in practice because
a state which is in the divorce-mill business would simply be decreasing the value of its
divorce decrees by making them vulnerable. Consult, Toward Certainty in the Extraterritorial Effect of Divorce Decrees, op. cit. supra note 37; Migratory Divorce, 2 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 298 (1935) (symposium); Conference on Divorce, 9 U. of Chi. Conference Series (1952).
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forum of attack to impeach the divorce court's finding of domicile, as is true
of actions in rem generally. 40 Thus, this jurisdiction "in statum" effectuates a
decree with greater conclusiveness than the traditional judgment in rem.
This finality is the effect of the Supreme Court's decision in Cook v. Cook. 41 In
that case, Mr. Cook (H-2) brought an annulment action in Vermont alleging
that Mrs. Cook (W) was still married to Mr. Mann (H-i). The solution to this
question rested on the effect to be given to a Florida decree purporting to
divorce W from H-1. This decree recited that W was domiciled in Florida, but
H-2 argued that such determination was in fact erroneous42 The facts were such
that the Vermont courts could reasonably believe H-2's contention that W was
not domiciled in Florida at the time of her divorce from H-1.4 Nevertheless, the
Court first presumed, 44 over dissent, 4s that H-1 had appeared in the Florida
proceedings (the record being silent on this point), and then held that H-2 was
bound by the Florida decree and, in effect, was precluded from showing the
absence of domicile. 4 Thus, Cook indicates that a bilateral decree of divorce
based on a finding of domicile is invulnerable as to a stranger waging collateral
attack; 47 whatever interest he may have had in the marital res is conclusively
barred.
It is difficult, however, to understand the basis of this holding in Cook. The
only indication given by the Court was its reasoning that:
40 Consult authorities cited notes 12 and 13 supra.
- 342 U.S. 126 (19515.
4'Brief for Respondent, at 2, 5-6, 8-10.
43 Transcript of Record, at 12-14. Upon remand the Vermont Supreme Court acquiesced to
the presumption that H-1 had appeared so the question of W's domicile became academic.
Cook v. Cook, 117 Vt. 173, 86 A.2d 923 (1952).
44 Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126, 129 (1951): "A judgment presumes jurisdiction over the
subject matter and over the persons." The Vermont Supreme Court had also recognized the
lack of a finding on this point. Cook v. Cook, 116 Vt. 374, 378, 76 A.2d 593, 595 (1950).
"Justice Frankfurter differed with the majority only insofar as it presumed that silence
in the record as to whether or not H-1 had appeared in the Florida proceedings justified a
presumption of appearance. Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126, 132 (1951) ("And yet the Vermont
Supreme Court is reversed on the unwarranted presumption that Mann [H-1] appeared in the
Florida suit."). He reasoned that since it was "inconceivable that the Vermont courts did not
know that the fraudulent claim of domicile by a divorcing spouse is irrelevant to the enforceability in sister States of a decree of divorce if the other spouse contests or consents to the
proceeding leading to the decree," then in annulling the marriage the Vermont courts must
have found the Florida proceeding ex parte and, therefore, were competent to refuse full
faith and credit to the Florida decree under the rule of Williams v. North Carolina II, 325
U.S. 226 (1945).
4" Unless Florida would allow the second husband to attack the decree in Florida. Cook v.
Cook, 342 U.S. 126, 128 (1951); Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581, 587 (1951).
4 But compare Necessity For Domicile in Two-Party Divorces, 52 Col. L. Rev. 282, 283
(1952), which suggests, in spite of the Court's broad use of stranger, quoted in text at
note 48 infra, that not all strangers are precluded by the holding of Cook v. Cook since there
H-2's interest in the marital status had not accrued by the time W secured her divorce from
H-1. Thus, if the Supreme Court wants to escape the full impact of its broad holding in the
Cook case, it may confine the case as precedent to attacks by subsequent spouses.
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If the defendant spouse appeared in the Florida proceedings and contested the issue
of the wife's domicile (Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343) or appeared and admitted her
Florida domicile (Coe -v.Coe, 334 U.S. 378) or was personally served in the divorce state
(Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581, 587), he would be barred from attacking the
decree collaterally; and so would a strangerto the Floridaproceedings, such as respondent,
unless Floridaapplies a less strict rude of res judicata to the second husband than it does
to the first. 4s (Italics added.)
Alternative explanations may be offered for this intriguing language. It might
imply that collateral attack upon a bilateral decree of divorce must fail because
there is nothing in such a decree left open to attack. In other words, domicile-so
long a basis of divorce jurisdiction-is no longer essential. 49 While such a development may be foreseen,50 it is unlikely that the Supreme Court would discard
its long-established requirement of domicile by implication, and there are subsequent indications by the Court that it has not.51
A sounder explanation is suggested by the Court's use of the term res judicata. Since it is clear that the scope of res judicata in actions in personam binds
only parties and their privies52 and does not extend so far as to bind strangers,53
the Court must have meant that a divorce rendered pursuant to bilateral jurisdictional circumstance results in a decree akin to a judgment in rem. This does
not explain, however, why attack for defect in jurisdiction, i.e., erroneous finding of domicile, is not permitted.
Though it was not cited by the Court, some technical justification for this
extraordinary finality may be found in the comparatively ancient case of
Cheever v.
ison.54 It was held there "that a decree of divorce granted by a
state in which one spouse was domiciled and which had personal jurisdiction
over the other was as conclusive in the other state as it was in the state where it
48Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126, 127-28 (1951).
49 This interpretation is suggested in Stimson, Jurisdiction in Divorce Cases: The Unsoundness of the Domiciliary Theory, 42 A. B. A. J. 222, 224 (1956).
51The tolerance with which the Court has viewed mere formal compliance with the present
requirement of domicile (e.g., the remarks of Justice Frankfurter in note 61 infra), and the
diminishing significance of real domicile which is the practical effect of such decisions as Coe v.
Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948), and Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948), suggest the eventual
demise of that requirement. The voice of dissent has already been raised. Consult the remarks
of Justice Rutledge and Judge Hastie in note 68 infra.
51See Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1, 4, 15-16 (1955). Note also that when
Justice Jackson, dissenting in May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 538 (1953), declared that he
was "quite aware that in recent times this Court has been chipping away at the concept of
domicile," he did not concede that the concept had been chipped away with respect to divorce
jurisdiction but rather limited his proposition to a state's power to tax.
5
2 Good Health Dairy Products Corp. v. Emery, 275 N.Y. 14, 9 N.E.2d 758 (1937); Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal.2d 807, 812, 122 P.2d 892, 894 (1942) ("He is bound by that
litigation only if he has been a party thereto or in privity with a party thereto."). Consult
Rest., Judgments §79 et seq. (1942); 10 Am. Law & Proc., Judgments §41(1) (1912).
63 See, e.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940). Consult 1 Freeman, Judgments §407
(5th ed., 1925); Rest., Judgments §§1, Comment e, 93 et seq. (1942).
54 9 WalI.(U.S.) 108 (1869). The facts are set forth in note 35 supra.
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was obtained." 5 Cheever was decided long before Williams v. North CarolinaI,
during a period when something more than the ordinary domicile of one spouse
was necessary for the compulsory recognition of sister-state ex parte decrees of
divorce, viz., "matrimonial" domicile. 56 Ordinary domicile alone conferred no
power upon a divorce court to render a decree to which sister states were required to accord full faith and credit.57 In Cheever, however, when defendant's
appearance was coupled with ordinary domicile, a jurisdiction matured which
apparently was at least as conclusive as that produced by matrimonial domicile
alone. Whether or not it was more conclusive, i.e., cut off the stranger's opportunity to impeach the decree by re-litigating the finding of domicile, was not answered since the stranger there had "reserve[d] to himself the right to impeach it if
occasion should offer and require him to do so."s Nevertheless, Cheever v. Wilson
suggests that the appearance of the defendant spouse does not operate simply
as a personal estoppel against him, but that it somehow joins the divorce
court'sfinding of domicile of the plaintiff and produces a jurisdiction the product
of which is unassailable, unlike the jurisdiction effectuated by the divorce
court's impeachable finding of matrimonial domicile.
A further justification for the holding in Cook v. Cook may be suggested. It is
best seen by comparing the effect of a bilateral decree with that of an ex parte
decree. In the latter situation, where collateral attack is permitted for jurisdictional defect, the plaintiff's affirmative allegations of domicile in the divorce
proceedings were unchallenged unless questioned by the court on its own
motion.59 No litigant whose interest in regard to this issue is adverse to that of
the plaintiff contested or even had an opportunity to contest the existence of
domicile. But such an opportunity was presented ex hypothesi in the case of a
bilateral decree.6" The defendant spouse, whose interest on the narrow issue of
domicile is at least in theory adverse to that of the plaintiff and identical with
that of strangers who may later desire to attack the decree, had full opportunity
to contest the existence of domicile. Consequently, it may be concluded that
since their point of view on the question of domicile has been represented in the
original proceedings, 6' strangers should not later be allowed to re-litigate the
5 Williams v. North Carolina I, 317 U.S. 287, 296 (1942).
Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155 (1901). See Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562
(1906). Consult Rheinstein, The Constitutional Bases of Jurisdiction, 22 U. of Chi. L. Rev.
775, 775 n. 2 (1955).
67 Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906).
1, Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall.(U.S.) 108, 122 (1869).
325 U.S. 226 (1945); Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175 (1901);
59E.g., Williams v. North Carolina 11,
Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, 181 U.S. 179 (1901). Cf. Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667 (C.A. 3d, 1953),
cert. granted 347 U.S. 911 (1954), but mooted so dismissed, 347 U.S. 610 (1954).
60E.g., Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378, 380-81 (1948); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 346
(1948).
61The suggestion that a general denial entered by a cooperative defendant spouse constitutes an adequate representation of absent strangers with similar interests on the issue of
domicile is acceptable in theory only. But thewhole scheme of recognition of sister-state decrees
of divorce is characteristically indulgent toward technically sound theoretical rules which are
56
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question. This amounts to treating the original finding of domicile as correct,
which is of course the holding in Cook v. Cook.
In summary, one aspect of Cook results in a situation much like that of the
typical judgment in rem-strangers being bound thereby although not parties
or in privity with parties to the original proceedings. The inability of a stranger
to attack the prior decree for jurisdictional defect, however, appears to differ
from the general in rem situation. Nevertheless, if the reasoning discussed above
as to the defendant spouse representing strangers' interests is accepted, it may
be urged that even this aspect of Cook v. Cook is not inconsistent with a judg62
ment in rem.
The necessity of a finding of domicile remains to be discussed. Although there
is no authority directly on point, recent cases indicate that a bilateral decree
not based on a finding of domicile is not entitled to full faith and credit.3 It is
reasoned that such a decree violates due process of law where rendered, 64 and
consequently is not entitled to full faith and credit elsewhere. 5 However, it is
embarrassed by reality. E.g.: "Sherrer v. Sherrer, supra, and Coe v. Coe ... were not puss-inthe-comer adjudications. It is inconceivable that the Vermont courts did not know that the
frawdient claim of domicile by a divorcing spouse is irrelevant to the enforceability in sister
States of a decree of divorce if the other spouse contests or consents to the proceeding leading to the decree." (Italics added.) Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126, 131-32 (1951) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
62No case has been found dealing with collateral attack for jurisdictional defect by a claimant to the res where other claimants had already litigated jurisdiction in the original proceeding.
63See Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667, 674-75 (C.A. 3d, 1953), cert. granted 347 U.S. 911
(1954), but mooted so dismissed 347 U.S. 610 (1954); Jennings v. Jennings, 251 Ala. 73, 74-75,
36 So.2d 236, 238 (1948). But cf. Drew v. Hobby, 123 F.Supp. 245 (S.D.N.Y., 1954). An exception to the Alton view is found in two recent cases, both of which involve special circumstances. Crownover v. Crownover, 58 N.M. 597, 274 P.2d 127 (1954) (statute conclusively
presuming domicile from one year's residence held valid in its purposed application to divorce
of military personnel who, being under orders, should not be required to possess the requisite
animi,nanendi et non reverledi-which are commonly said to be essential to domicile); DavidZieseniss v. Zieseniss, 205 N.Y.Misc. 836, 129 N.Y. S.2d 649 (S.Ct., 1954) (New York statute
giving state courts jurisdiction to dissolve marriages solely upon the basis that the parties
were married in New York held valid). Whether or not these decisions are correct, and what is
the effect to be given decrees so issued are open questions. Consult Stimson, op. cit. supra
note 49.
64Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667 (C.A. 3d, 1953), cert. granted 347 U.S. 911 (1954), but
mooted so dismissed 347 U.S. 610 (1954), holding that even where both parties are before the
divorce court, the court could not render a decree, pursuant to the second part of a Virgin
Islands' statute presuming domicile, without violating the Due Process Clause. The same Court
of Appeals in Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 214 F.2d 820 (1954), decided the same issue
raised by identical facts, only to be affirmed on a different ground by the Supreme Court, 349
U.S. 1 (1955). Compare Jennings v. Jennings, 251 Ala. 73, 36 So.2d 236 (1948), where the
Alabama Supreme Court, without mentioning due process of law, held that a statute allowing
dissolution of marriages where both parties are before the court but without a finding of domicile exceeded the power of the state legislature. "[W]e say that the legislature of a state cannot
confer on the courts of that state a power which is not within the power of the state to confer
on the legislature." Ibid., at 75, 238.
"Judge Goodrich states that "[w]ith regard to this type of case one can generalize and say

that due process of law at home and full faith and credit in another state are correlative."
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difficult to comprehend exactly how a party before the court in this situation
is in any way deprived of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law."66 It may thus be significant that this question was studiously avoided the
7
only time it was presented to the Supreme Court.
Nevertheless, assuming due process of law is satisfied by a bilateral proceeding without a finding of domicile, it does not necessarily follow that the decree
will be entitled to full faith and credit. Although the finality of decrees would
9
be enhanced,68 and the temptation for perjury reduced, the effect of compulsory interstate recognition would be to allow any one state to establish the
divorce standards for the entire nation.70 Such a result runs counter to long
Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667, 676 (C.A. 3d, 1953), cert. granted 347 U.S. 911 (1954), but
mooted so dismissed 347 U.S. 610 (1954). Judge Hastie, dissenting, seemed to agree on this
point: "Perhaps full faith and credit should be given to every American divorce decree which
satisfies due process." Ibid., at 684. Judge Goodrich's view is correct where due process is
violated, since full faith and credit is not required to be given to a nullity. See Williams v.
North Carolina II, 325 U.S. 226, 227-29 (1945). But of course securing a judgment in full
compliance with due process of law does not assure that it will be given full faith and credit.
See Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906). Consult Currie, Full Faith and Credit to
Foreign Land Decrees, 21 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 620, 667 n. 166 (1954).
66 U.S. Const. Amend. 14, §1. Consult Rheinstein, op. cit. supra note 56; Griswold, Divorce
Jurisdiction and Recognition of Divorce Decrees-A Comparative Study, 65 Harv. L. Rev.
193, 197-208 (1951).
67
In Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1, 26 (1955), the Supreme Court stated
that a Virgin Islands' statute which created a presumption of domicile was "designed for
export" and thus was not within the power delegated to the Islands' Legislative Assembly by
Congress. The dissent thought that "[t]here are limits to which the Court should not run to
escape a constitutional adjudication.... Nevertheless, the Virgin Islands are entitled to a
forthright adjudication on their statute-not one by aphantom escape clause."
68 The vulnerable point of a divorce decree at which an attack is launched is the jurisdictional finding of plaintiff's domicile. If a finding of domicile is held unnecessary to the decree
for purposes of full faith and credit, then a stranger would have nothing to attack, except,
of course, the fact that defendant appeared. A hint at the elusiveness of a finding of domicile
and perhaps the reason for some judicial displeasure with the concept of domicile are seen,
for example, in Justice Rutledge's strong dissent in Williams v. North Carolina 11, 325 U.S.
226, 255 (1945): "The Constitution does not mention domicile. Nowhere does it posit the
powers of the states or the nation upon that amorphous, highly variable common-law conception." Judge Hastie appears to agree in his dissent in Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667, 681
(C.A.3d, 1953), cert. granted 347 U.S. 911 (1954), but mooted so dismissed 347 U.S. 610 (1954):
"My conclusion is that.., the limitation of the divorce power to the domiciliary state has no
such ancient roots or impressive history as to suggest its entitlement to perpetuation as a constitutional requirement." But compare the language of Justice Frankfurter in note 71 infra.
69See Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1, 28 (1955); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334
U.S. 343, 356-57 (1948). Consult Rheinstein, op. cit. supra note 66, at 776.
70See Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 366 (1948); Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562,
574 (1906). It will be noted that the holding in Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951), comes perilously close to being subject to the objection stated in the text. If a mere finding of domicile in
a bilateral proceeding operates so as to preclude collateral attack, it is possible for non-domiciliary parties through collusion to obtain a divorce decree which will be valid in other states.
Defendant need only admit plaintiff's affirmative allegations. Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948).
Theonlyprotection against such procedure is the divorce court,which can as a general rule raise
the question of domicile on its own motion. This is sometimes done. Consult Alton v. Alton, 207
F.2d 667 (C.A.3d, 1953), cert. granted 347 U.S. 911 (1954), but mooted so dismissed 347 U.S.
610 (1954).
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accepted doctrine.7' However, if compulsory recognition were not required this
would create a situation analogous to that which followed Haddock v. Haddock1
-a decree being valid where rendered and yet not entitled to full faith and
credit elsewhere. Thus, the evils which led to the rejection of Haddock in Williams I7 militate against approval of a situation whereby a valid decree is
denied full faith and credit. Alternatively, these same evils may well lead to an
acceptance of the position that a bilateral decree not based on a finding of domicile violates due process of law. 74 And it is clear that full faith and credit need
not be given to such a decree. 7
The major unsettled question in the context of stranger attack on sisterstate divorce decrees concerns attack by a state on an out-of-state bilateral
decree. Could Vermont convict Mrs. Cook of bigamous cohabitation 6 by claiming that her divorce from Mr. Mann was invalid, even though Mr. Cook was
unsuccessful in his annulment action based on a similar claim? The weight of
77
authority is in the negative.
Proper analysis of this question raises a preliminary inquiry. As a general
rule, full faith and credit requires that all states give a sister state's judgment
the same force and effect as it has in the state of its rendition.78 For example,
1 Justice Frankfurter states the traditional view in Williams v. North Carolina 11, 325 U.S.
226, 229 (1945): "Under our system of law, judicial power to grant a divorce-jurisdiction, strictly speaking-is founded on domicil. Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175; Andrews v. Andrews,
188 U.S. 14. The framers of the Constitution were familiar with this jurisdictional prerequisite,
and since 1789 neither this Court nor any other court in the English-speaking world has
questioned it. Domicil implies a nexus between person and place of such permanence as to
control the creation of legal relations and responsibilities of the utmost significance." For the
contrary view consult note 68 supra.
72 201 U.S. 562 (1906).
73 These evils were foreseen by justice Holmes in his dissent therein: "ITlhe decision not
only reverses a previous well-considered decision of this court but is likely to cause considerable disaster to innocent persons and to bastardize children hitherto supposed to be the
offspring of lawful marriage. .. ." Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 628 (1906). Consult
Overton, Sister State Divorces, 22 Tenn. L. Rev. 891, 896 (1953).
74
The dilemmaposed by the preceding discussion is suggested in Currie, op. cit. supra note
65, at 667 n. 166. In substance it is this: Given bilateral proceedings, domicile is or is not required for due process of law. If it is, technical justification is difficult. If it is not, and if full
faith and credit is given to the resultant decree, then the lowest common denominator in
divorce laws may become the law throughout the country (at least as to bilateral divorces).
But if full faith and credit is not given, then the evils of the Haddock case reappear. Thus,
every alternative seems undesirable-the least so appearing to be retention of the domicile
requirement, since it presents only difficulties in legal theory, and not in practical effect.
75Consult discussion note 65 supra.
76 Vt. Rev. Stat., c. 370, §8470 (1947).
77 Hack v. Industrial Commission, 74 Ariz. 305, 248 P.2d 863 (1952); State v. Foster, 5
Ter.(Del.) 384, 57 A.2d 58 (1948). Cf. Drew v. Hobby, 123 F.Supp. 245 (S.D.N.Y., 1954).
Contra: Lipham v. State, 68 Ga. App. 174, 22 S.E.2d 532 (1942); Goodrich, Conflict of Laws
401 (3d ed., 1949).
78 "Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall

have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories

and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Pos-

session from which they are taken." 62 Stat. 947 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. §1738 (1950).
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in Johnson v. Muelbergere9 and Cook v.Cook,"0 reference was made to the law
of Florida as the measure of the binding effect of Florida decrees in other states.
However, since the issue of the effect of a Florida decree in other states cannot
arise in Florida, Florida can have no law directly on point. Thus, these cases
must mean that the law of the state of rendition is determinative of the scope
of full faith and credit only insofar as it indicates the result which would obtain
if the attack had been brought in the rendering state. Conversely, the state of
rendition can have no law relevant to the question of full faith and credit where
the attack is of such a nature that it could not in the first instance be waged in
the courts of the rendering state. This situation is clearly presented when a
decree is attacked by a sister state in a prosecution for bigamous cohabitation,
for it is obvious that the sister state could not have prosecuted its charges in the
state of rendition. In such circumstances, it is suggested that federal law should
control the interstate effect of the decree.81
In support of the view that Vermont as a matter offederal law could not succeed in its prosecution of Mrs. Cook, it may be urged that no basis is apparent
under the holding of Cook v. Cook upon which to distinguish the position of a
sister state from that of strangers generally. No distinction obtains in the ex
parte situation under the rule in Williams I, which would seem to indicate that
a sister state has no peculiar interest demanding special treatment. In fact, any
inequality of interest deemed to exist may well weigh in favor of natural-person
strangers because of the protection afforded the latter by the Due Process
82
Clause.
To the contrary it may be argued that the requirements of our federal system
demand some basis for the frustration of a sister state's policy beyond mere
physical presence of the parties to the bilateral proceedings.83 Thus, historically,
some connection of the parties to the divorce state-typically domicile-has
been necessary as a basis for divorce jurisdiction.8 4 To preclude a sister state
from showing the absence of domicile can therefore only encourage collusion"
79340 U.S. 581 (1951).
80 342 U.S. 126 (1951).
81 Cf. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892) (whether judgment of sister state was
based upon penal cause of action and so might be denied full faith and credit a matter of

federal law, regardless of how it was characterized by that state); Bigelow v. Old Dominion
Copper Co., 225 U.S. 111, 139 (1912) (whether judgment dismissing bill against one joint

tortfeasor is bar to suit against the other in a sister state is a matter of full faith and credit to
be determined "under the general law" [only federal precedents utilized], although it was such
a bar in the state where rendered).
82
U.S. Const. Amend. 14, §1("... nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law. .. "). (Italics added.)
83 Consult, e.g., Williams v. North Carolina II,.325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945).
84
Ibid.
8
6There was clear evidence of just this type of collusion to secure a divorce in Cook v.
Cook, 342 U.S. 126, 126-27 (1951). However, the Court did not rule upon the question of
whether or not Mr. Cook could be estopped because of the collusion since that issue was not
raised. Cook v. Cook, 116 Vt. 374, 76 A.2d 593 (1950). But there is authority supporting the
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and consequent successful evasion of the divorce laws of the state of actual
domicile.8" Final decision of this difficult question awaits a determination by
the Supreme Court.
If a state does fall within the term strangeras used in Cook v. Cook, 8 7 then a

symmetry between stranger attack and party attack exists in the bilateral area
as it does in regard to an ex parte decree.88 Where the defendant spouse was
within the personal jurisdiction of the court and had an opportunity to litigate
the allegation of domicile, 9 he is thereafter conclusively bound by the finding
of domicile.90 And, where parties are bound by the bilateral decree, so also are
strangers. The chink in the armor of an ex parte decree-impeachable finding
of domicile-appears to clamp shut with the thaumaturgic touch of a cooperative defendant spouse who submits to the personal jurisdiction of the court. At
the very least this result may lay claim to the virtue of greater certainty upon
which interested persons may rely. And, as much as it may be deplored by those
who fear that undue prejudice may accrue to strangers conclusively bound by
the decree,91 the result may perhaps be made more palatable by treating some
of the interests of strangers as rights in personam in order that they may obtain
the same protection available to the spouse absent from an ex parte divorce
proceeding under the doctrine of divisibility.
view that Mr. Cook could be precluded on that ground alone. E.g., Estate of Coleman, 132
Cal.App.2d 137, 281 P.2d 567 (1955).
8
6No case has been found illustrating attack by a non-domiciliary state. But cf. Drew v.
Hobby, 123 F.Supp. 245 (S.D.N.Y., 1954).
s 342 U.S. 126, 127 (1951).
88 Consult discussion at 380 supra.
"Consult authorities cited note 36 supra. The divorce decree "by default" is an open
question, i.e., does the doctrine of Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948), and Sherrer v. Sherrer,
334U.S. 343 (1948), extend so far as to include the case where the defendant spouse was merely
served with process but failed to appear either personally or through an attorney? The question
will probably be answered in the affirmative. See, e.g., Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126, 128 (1951):
"On the other hand, if the defendant spouse had neither appeared nor been served in Florida,
the Vermont court, under the ruling in Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, could reopen
the issue of domicile."
90 Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); Davis v. Davis,
305 U.S. 32 (1938). Compare Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951).
"1Consult, e.g., Merrill, The Utility of Divorce Recognition Statutes in Dealing with the
Problem of Migratory Divorce, 27 Tex. L. Rev. 291, 311 (1949); Toward Certainty in the
Extraterritorial Effect of Divorce Decrees, op. cit. supra note 37. But compare Necessity for
Domicile in Two-Party Divorces, op. cit. supra note 47, for a favorable view.

